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THE ECONOMIC LOSSES CAUSED BY BUSINESS CYCLES
Br WESLEY C. MITCHELL AND WILLFORD I. KING
NATIONAL BUREAU OF EcoNoMIc RESEARCH
I. THE PROBLEM
The amount of energy it is wise to spend on efforts to control the busi-
ness cycle depends upon the gains in national welfare which can be secured.
The most definite of these prospective gains consists in diminishing the
economic losses we now suffer from the wastes of booms, the forced liquida-
tions of crises, and the involuntary idleness of depressions.
To measure these losses accurately is impossible.The chief difficulty
is not lack of statistical data, though the data leave much to be desired,
but the difficulty of deciding what effect the diminution of the present
violent fluctuations would have upon the level about which the national
income now oscillates.This problem must be faced before we can decide
how to use what statistics we have.
First, it is clear that crises and depressions produce some salutary
effects at present.They check foolish speculation, weed out incompetent
business managers, give both employers and employees an incentive
to greater efficiency, and stimulate the adoption of more economical
methods of production.'Further, as Edwin F. Gay has recently pointed
out, hard times have ledto many transformations in economic
organization.
The crises of 1857 and 1860 gave birth to the clearing-house [loan certificate]
system.The reaction to the inflationist doctrine springing from the crises of
'73 and '93 soundly educated the country to the need of a gold basis for our
currency.The banking crisis of 1907 definitely brought to a head the movement
for the development of central banking, which resulted in the Federal Reserve
System.. ..Themovement of population from the industrial East to the
agricultural West has been stimulated in the past by each period of economic
depression.. ..Mergersof industrial corporations, the cooperation of trade
'I think you admit too much.If business were kept running on an even keel, the
incompetent would in time be weeded out and foolish speculations would be checked.
Severe illnesses resulting from over eating have led many people to adopt salutary
dietary rules.But the latter do not represent "improvements" or "advances."
The people in question would be better off and more efficient if the excesses in question
had not made remedies necessary.—Note by T. S. ADAMS.
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associations and of trade unions have allgrownthrough learning the need of
closer cohesion from the lesson of adversity.'
While the specific changes here mentioned may be deemed either good
or bad, it is evident that such remodeling of our social fabric is likely
often to result in marked improvements.
Of course, all this does not mean that crises and depressions are
blessings in disguise which we should be foolish to stop if we could.The
economic changes cited by Mr. Gay mean rather that our predecessors
have felt crises and depressions to be misfortunes and have taken meas-
ures which they hoped would prevent their recurrence.So far as these
measures have succeeded, their success is an encouragement to further
effort, and so far as they have failed, their failure means that the problem
is still to be solved.
But the question remains whether the elimination of crises and depres-
sions, could it be accomplished, might not leave the ill results of prosperity
unchecked.Would not losses from rash investments, the indefinite
survival of incompetent managers, the relaxing of effort by
employers and employees, and slowness in adopting technical improve-
ments—would not these losses continue if production were stabilized,
and would they not in the long run offset all the gains?
One answer to this query is that if the analysis in Chapter I is sound,
the ill effects of prosperity just mentioned are among the factors which
put an end to prosperity by breeding crises.In other words, methods
of combatting crises and depressions which leave the wastes of prosperity
unchecked will not prevent crises and depression from occurring.This
answer is conclusive in a formal sense, though it serves to show how
difficult it is to devise a plan of stabilizing business activity that will
accomplish its aim.To succeed, the plan must be effective in preventing
the wastes that now characterize booms as well as effective in relieving
the sufferings of depressions.
A second problem that must be faced before the costs of business
cycles can be estimated is suggested by what has just been said.If a
successful plan of avoiding crises and depressions must avoid also the
wastes of booms, would not that plan prevent production from reaching
such high levels as have marked our busiest years?Would not the level
of stabilized production be merely the level of a fairly prosperous year—
the level of 1912, for example, rather than the level of 1916?Therefore,
in estimating the gains theoretically attainable from perfect control
over the business cycle, is it proper to use differences between production
in the trough and production at the peak?Rather should not the
production of every year be compared with the production attained in
years of full employment without much overtime work, after this level
'The Next Great Inflation Credit Monthly, June, 1922.
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has been adjusted to allow for the factor of growth?Indeed, should
not the excess production of our busiest years above this "normal" level
be subtracted from the deficient production of poor years to estimate the
net loss from business cycles?And do not men unemployed in years
of depression turn out many goods not represented in the statistics
of production—garden products, home improvements, and the like?
No conclusive answer can be given to these questions, because we do
not know what would happen if things were not as they are.But an
offsetting series of questions comes to mind.Is the additional output of
material goods produced by the intense exertion of boom years a national
gain?Is it full compensation for the haste, the worry, and strain to
which workers on overtime and harried business men are subject?Does
not efficiency suffer in the long run from these strains and would not the
general level of production rise if they were removed?Similarly, are
not the ill effects of crises and depressions felt long after the hard times
are over?Are not many adults made permanently less capable workers
by the distress suffered and bad physiological or bad mental habits
formed when out of their jobs for months at a time?And are not many
children prevented from becoming as useful citizens as they might have
become, had family incomes been regular?
To repeat, the central difficulty of estimating the economic costs of
business cycles is that we do not know with certainty what effect the
removal of wide fluctuations in production would have upon national
efficiency in the long run.Lacking such knowledge, all we can do is to
show how far production in periods of depression falls below the records
of boom years and how far it falls below the records of active but
unhurried years.That is a technical problem in statistics for which the
two solutions can be roughly approximated.But when the solutions
have been found, we cannot prove that the higher or the lower figures
are the better.Indeed, anyone who thinks that greater regularity of
work and income would diminish efficiency may discount the lower
figures, and the majority who hold the opposite opinion may add to the
higher.
IL ESTIMATES OF THE LOSSES BASED UPON INDEX NUMBERS OF
PRODUCTION
At first thought, the easiest way of attacking the statistical problem
seems to be to deal with it piecemeal, taking one industry at a time and
analyzing the losses which are borne by property owners and employees
or saddled by the industry upon the consumers of its products.Careful
consideration, however, shows that this mode of attack is impracticable.
It leads to insoluble problems of what profits and wages might have been
in particular trades under conditions which have never prevailed; it
involves interminable details and calls for data not to be had.ECONOMIC LOSSES 35
The only feasible method of approximating roughly the economic
losses caused by business cycles is to deal with variations from year to year
in the production or the income of the nation as a whole.These varia-
tions have been investigated of late by two groups of workers—those who
have made index numbers of physical production, and those who have
estimated the income of the nation in dollars.By using both sets of
results itis possible to make two rough estimates of the differences
CHART1.—INDEXES ILLUSTRATING HIGHER AND LOWER ESTIMATES
OF MAXIMUM AS COMPARED WITH ACTUAL PHYSICAL PRODUCTION
IN THE COMBINED FIELDS OF MINING, MANUFACTURING, AND
TRANSPORTATION. 1890-1919.
140
betweenthe economic yields of good and bad years and to check the
results against each other.
Of the available index numbers of production, those made by
Edmund E. Day and Walter W. Stewart are best adapted to the present
purpose, in that they differentiate between the output of the farms, mines,
factories, and railroads.This matter is important because agricultural
production is affected more by the weather than by the business cycle;
for example, 1914 was a year of large harvests and 1916 a year of poor
yields.To include these erratic variations of the product of farths
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obscure what we wish to see clearly.Hence the following estimate is
based upon an average of Stewart's and Day's index numbers for the
TatE VHL—POSSIBLE COMPARED WITH ACTUAL ParsIca PRODUCTION IN THE
COMBINED FIELDS OF MINING, MANUFACTURING, AND TRANSPORTATION ACCORD-
ING TO Two DIFFERENT HYPOTHESES
A B C D E F 0 H
Higher estimate of loss Lower estimate of loss



















































































































































































































































































• Combination of indexes derived by Edmund E. Day and Walter W. Stewart, see An Index of
Pteysical Volume of Production (reprint from The Review of Economic Statistics, Sept., 1020—Jan.,
1921), p. 65; and An Index Number of Production, American Economic Review, March, 1921, p,58.
Weights used, the same for the indexesineach study: mining 1, factories 7,andrailways 2.ECONOMIC LOSSES 37
physical product turned out by mines, factories, and railroads.In
averaging, these industrial groups have been assigned weights of one, seven,
and two respectively.For the years preceding 1899 Stewart's index alone
has been used, since Day's investigation does not extend back of that
year.Column B of Table VIII presents the index of "actual physical
production" made in this way.
To compare the actual output of each year with the output of the best
years, a smoothed curve has been run through the peaks attained in 1891,
1906, and 1916.Had figures been available for the late '80's, a starting
point for this curve might have been obtained higher than that given by
1891, which was not a boom year.Chart 1 shows the smoothed curve
as weli as the fluctuating line of actual performance.Readings from the
smoothed curve on the chart supply the "higher estimate of maximum
possible production" shown in Column C of the table.
When this estimate of the level that production might attain if busi-
ness cycles were controlled is used as the basis for comparison, it appears
that in one year (1896) the actual output was curtailed by more than 20
per cent.In twelve years out of the thirty the deficiency of production
exceeded 10 per cent of what might have been attained.Taking the
whole period, good and bad years together, actual production was 8.5
per cent less than the hypothetical maximum.
Next, to compare actual production with a hypothetical level based
upon the output of active but unhurried years, a free hand curve has
been run roughly through the records of 1897, 1909, and 1912.This
curve also appears on the chart, and readings from it give the "lower
estimate of maximum probable production" in Column F of the table.
In ten out of the thirty years covered, the actual output exceeded
the "maximum probable production" estimated in this way, and these
excesses appear as minus quantities in the "loss" Columns G and H.But
in two-thirds of the years, production did not attain the level of such
seasons of revival as are here made the standard of comparison.In five
years the deficiency exceeded 10 per cent.Nor does the excess produc-
tion of the good times balance the deficient production of the dull times;
for, after subtracting the gains from the losses, there remains a net loss
of nearly 3 per cent of the output of a whole generation of effort.
III. ESTIMATE OF THE LOSSES BASED UPON THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE
NATION
Figures showing annual fluctuations in the national income are better
for the present purpose than index numbers of production in that they
are not confined to a restricted field of industries.Furthermore, it
seems probable that the production indexes fail to take sufficient account
of approximately stable industries such as merchandising and the hand38 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
trades, and that they stress the irregular output of raw materials too
much and the relatively steady production of finished products too little.
If these premises are true, the oscillations in industry as a whole may be
somewhat less marked than the estimate based upon production indexes
would lead us to believe.On the other hand, when we attempt to meas-
ure the variability in national productivity by the use of income statistics,
we are confronted by other difficulties.The income of farmers, which
is of course included, does not vary in harmony with the fluctuations in
other industries.Data are available for ten years only—a period too
brief to permit of measuring industrial trends with accuracy.And the
necessity of reducingamounts expressed in dollars to a hypothetical money
of constant purchasing power opens the door to new errors.Hence; the
estimates about to be given are, perhaps, not superior to those already
presented.
Table IX shows in Column Btheestimates of the aggregate incomes
of the people of the United States, prepared by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, after the wild price fluctuations have been eliminated
as well as may be.Since the period covered includes only one boom
year (1916), it would be going very far to draw from these data aline
showing production stabilized at the peak.But a line representing years
of considerable activity is suggested by 1910 and 1913 though both were
years of slowly receding business.Comparisons made between the
amounts indicated by this line and the actual income, as estimated, give
results corresponding to the smaller percentage losses obtained from the
index numbers of production.The two sets of percentage losses differ
somewhat, as is to be expected from the inclusion of farmers in one case
and their exclusion in the other, yet the percentages run on about the
same level, so that the one investigation confirms the other in a broad
sense.The most marked differences in results occur in 1909 and 1918.
According to Table IX, the loss of income from depression in the one
really bad year covered (1914), amounts to nearly 3,500,000,000 of pre-
war dollars—or not quite a tenth of the national income.In seven years
out of the ten the national income was below the level attained in periods
of moderate activity.Could these figures be extended through 1921,
they would probably show losses of greater magnitude.'
1 To draw the line of "active production" through two years so close together as
1910 and 1913 seems to me too doubtful even for "rough estimates."That it results
in erroneous conclusions is suggested to my mind by the loss of 5 per cent assigned to
the year 1918.I can hardly believe that the latter year was so far below what might
be called the "lower maximum."Contrast the percentage in Column H of Table X.
Neither do I believe that 1915 was 7.4 per cent below the "lower maximum."—Note
by T. S. ADAMS.ECONOMIC LOSSES 39
ABLE IX.—ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE Loss IN TEE INCOME OF THE PEOPLE OF TEE
UNITED STATES FROM IRREGULARITY OF PRODUCTION IN THE YEARS 1909—191S
3ased upon a comparison of the income of each year, expressed in pre-war dollars, with the level of
income attained in moderately active periods)






































































$354,790 $363,655 $8,865 2.4
a "Incomein the United States," vol.H, Table 20G (Publicationsof the
Iational Bureau of Economic Research).
IV. CONCLUSION
All that the preceding tables are meant to show, and that in a very
ough approximation, is the difference between the production of goods
r income in years of depression and production in years of moderate and
f intense activity.The broad result is that the worst years run some-
hing like 15 to 20 per cent behind the best, and something like 8 to 12
er cent behind the moderately good years.Even 10 per cent of the
ational income represents several billions of dollars.
Whether these figures indicate the order of magnitude of the material
sses imposed on the country by business depressions is open to argu-
ient.Quite apart from objections based upon theimperfections of the
batistical data that must be used in anyestimate, it may be contended
hat a reduction of economic uncertainty would lead to a decline of
ificiency.It may also be contended that both the strains of booms and40 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
the sufferings of depressions impair efficiency more than uncertaint:
stimulates it.The latter is probably the commoner opinion.Those
accept this view will regard even the higher of the estimates here pre
sented as understating the losses which plans for stabilizing productioi
aim to check.
Finally, it is obvious that certain intangibles of grave concern t
social welfare are omitted from our estimates and cannot be insertec
later by any process of correction.Privation, anxiety, loss of self-respec
—the concomitants of unemployment—are evils not measurable in dollar
or percentages of physical production.To say that these evils
the amount of wealth produced in future years may be proper.Bu
even so, that correction leaves out the saddest part of the reckoning—
the part that cannot be put into figures.